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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
will be under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act; and
if the injury is sustained on land, the state workmen's compensation
proceedings will provide the remedy.
STEPHEN C. COWPER
Early Statutory and Common Law of Divorce in North Carolina
American courts and legislatures have for a century and a half
looked with disfavor on the dissolution of marriage.' In so doing
they have created a fifty-headed hydra of an internecine complexity
unparalled in the law. Here we shall investigate the birth and early
childhood of that great serpent in North Carolina.
At the outset it is well to agree on just what is meant by the
term "divorce." Historically, it has been used to describe four dis-
tinct remedies affecting the marital status: (1) divorce a mensa et
thoro, (2) divorce a vinculo matrimonii by legislative act, (3) di-
vorce a vinculo matrimonii by judicial decree, and (4) annulment.
At common law the term "divorce" properly comprehended only
the divorce a mensa et thoro, commonly known as legal separation or
divorce from bed and board, although annulment was often incor-
rectly termed "absolute divorce." 2 In its modern sense, as a dissolu-
tion of a valid existing marriage, "divorce" means a divorce a
vinculo matrimonii by judicial decree8 or legislative act.4 The latter
has become obsolete.
1 "We reconcile ourselves to what is inevitable. Experience finds pain
more tolerable than it was expected to be; and habit makes even fetters light.
Exertion, when known to be useless, is unassayed; though the struggle might
be violent, if by possibility it could be successful. A married couple thus
retrained may become, if not devoted in their affections, at least discreet
partners, striving together for the common good, and steady friends, ready
to perform all offices of kindness required by the other-instead of the dis-
sentient heads of a distracted family, driven by inflamed passions to a
degree of madness not to be satisfied with less than an entire separation,
though it bring disgrace on themselves and their offspring, and deprive the
latter of the greatest earthly advantage, the nurture and admonitions of a
parent." Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. 535, 542 (1832). Compare the
views of South Carolina and Georgia: "The policy of this State has ever
been against divorces. It is one of her boasts that no divorce has ever been
granted in South Carolina." Hair v. Hair, 31 S.C. Eq. 163, 174 (1858).
"[I]n South Carolina... to her unfading honor, a divorce has not been
granted since the Revolution ... ." Head v. Head, 2 Ga. 191, 196 (1847).
2 This convenient dichotomy caused some confusion. See, e.g., Crump v.
Morgan, 38 N.C. 91 (1843).
'Absolute divorce by judicial decree was unknown in England until the
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. ch. 85. There were a few
instances of such decrees during the early years of the Reformation, but it
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COMMON LAW
Before 1857 all matrimonial causes in England were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.5 Marriage, being
one of the seven sacraments of the church, was absolutely insoluble
if validly contracted.' The common law knew no absolute divorce.
However, the church could not compel two completely antipathetic
persons to live together in peace. Separation was inevitable. To
protect the husband from spurious heirs born to the wife during
such a separation, and to provide for her support, the ecclesiastical
courts would, for weighty reason, legalize the separation. But the
marriage was not dissolved; in the eyes of God and the law it still
existed.' This legal separation, the divorce a menma et thoro, could
be obtained for two causes: cruelty or adultery.' Basically, this was
the divorce law officially received in North Carolina in 1715.9
Since the colonies had no ecclesiastical courts,"° and neither law
was definitely settled in the reign of Elizabeth I that the ecclesiastical courts
could not grant absolute divorce. See SHELFORD, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 374(Law Lib. ed. 1841) [hereinafter cited as SHELFORD]; BISHOP, MARRIAGE
& DIVORCE § 65 (6th ed. 1881) [hereinafter cited as BISHOP]; McGREGOR,
DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 22 (1957).
"The first recorded instance of a legislative divorce in England was
that of the Marquis of Northampton in the last year of the reign of Henry
VIII, but the act was repealed the very next year when the Roman Catholic
Mary I succeeded her father. The second instance was in 1688 but it was
with the greatest difficulty that the bill passed the House of Lords; all the
Lords Spiritual voted against it. Beginning in 1715 divorce acts became
common. However, they were so expensive that only the very wealthy could
afford them. Parliament would grant an absolute divorce only for adultery,
and then only after the petitioner had obtained both a divorce a nensa et
thoro from the ecclesiastical courts and a verdict at law for criminal con-
versation. The total cost of all these proceedings has been estimated at from
£600 to £800. BISHOP § 662; McGREGOR, DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 10-11, 17(1957); NELSON, DIVORCE & SEPARATION § 400 (1895).
'BIsHOP §§ 9, 48; 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *433.
'POYNTER, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 168 (Law Lib. ed. 1836). This doc-
trine was based on the biblical injunction "What therefore God hath joined
together, let no man put asunder." St. Matthew 19:6.
"POYNTER, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 181; SHELFORD 364.
8 SHELFORD, ibid.
'N.C. Gra. STAT. § 4-1 (1953).
"0 The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669), art. 45, provided
for a Chamberlain's Court which was to have jurisdiction over all matri-
monial causes. However, the constitutions were never an effectual instru-
ment of government and there is no record that the Chamberlain's Court was
ever established. 1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA xvii-xviii(1886); 25 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 123, 128 (1906); 1 LEFLER,
HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 42-43 (1956).
There were no bishops in America even though the Church of England
was established fairly early in most of the Southern Colonies, and eventually
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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
nor equity could decree divorces at common law, no type of divorce,
as such, was known in the colonial courts until requisite jurisdiction
was conferred by statute." Until the courts were granted divorce
jurisdiction legislative divorce was quite common in New England.12
However, no record exists of a legislative divorce in the southern
colonies until after the Revolution.'3 What transpired in North
Carolina during these hundred years? There is no reason to believe
that domestic tranquility was any more pronounced here than in
New England.
In the early years the answer lies most probably in the relatively
primitive state of society. The evidence indicates that most marital
difficulties were settled privately with little or no interference from
the state. 4 A dissentient couple simply separated and dissolved
their marriage by mutual consent. One or both might migrate to
another colony, or to the western territories, to begin life anew with
another mate. It is not improbable that in some cases both remained
in the same general vicinity. Certainly desertion of wives was a
very common occurrence, as is evidenced by the large number of
private acts passed for their relief. 5 There is at least one docu-
mented instance of a formal contract,' 6 the language of which bears
the clear mark of a lawyer, in which the parties agreed to dissolve
their marriage and bound themselves to refrain from prosecuting each
other should either remarry.
in all of the colonies. No bishop, no court. The Church was established in
North Carolina in 1703. N.C. Sess. Laws 1703, ch. 1, as amended, 1720,
ch. 2; 25 STATE REcoRDs OF NORTH CAROLINA 166.
" Bisnop § 69. After the passage of the divorce acts in the several states
a lively dispute arose over whether the ecclesiastical law is part of the
common law, or whether divorce is purely statutory. The best theory holds
that ecclesiastical law is properly part of the common law, but is in abeyance
or vested solely in the legislature until courts competent to administer it are
established. Le Barron v. Le Barron, 35 Vt. 365 (1862). New York early
held the opposite view. Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 557, 14 Am. Dec. 563
(N.Y. Ch. 1825). Accord, Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694
(1929) ; Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29 (1877) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 22 N.M. 192,
159 Pac. 1007 (1916). Contra, Chapman v. Chapman, 269 Mo. 663, 192
S.W. 448 (1917) ; Fowler v. Moore, 46 Nev. 65, 207 Pac. 75 (1922) ; Crump
v. Morgan, 38 N.C. 91 (1843); Le Barron v. Le Barron, supra. See also
Bis~rop §§ 56, 57, 69; NELSON, DIVORCE & SEPARATION § 10.
12 Especially in Massachusetts. 2 HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL
INSTITUTIONS 330-66 (1904).13Id. at 367.1 4 JOnNSoN, ANTE-BELLum NORTH CAROLINA 217-23 (1937).
1 See text at note 35, infra.
"0 Quoted in JOHNsoN, ANTE-BELLUm NORTH CAROLINA at 220. The
cited source is a MS among Legislative Papers 1807 in the North Carolina
State Archives. See Appendix III.
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As the state became more settled and property rights more im-
portant such primitive solutions became unfeasible. Soon after the
Revolution petitions for divorce began to pour into the legislature,1"
a body neither suited for nor sympathetic to such matters. Agita-
tion for a general divorce statute was begun as early as 1790"s but
it took the legislature twenty-four years to respond. It was in such
a situation of stress that equity invented the action of alimony with-
out divorce as a partial solution to an intolerable situation.
It is not certain just when the action of alimony without divorce
first began; certainly it was unknown to the common law. How-
ever, by 1796 the action was firmly imbedded in the equity juris-
prudence of North Carolina. The earliest reported cases indicate
that it had been known for some years. 9 From 1796 to 1800 there
were at least four such suits from which the records have survived.20
"' At least as soon as 1779. "Read the Petition of Alexander Dickson of
Duplin County, praying a Divorce from Elizabeth his wife. Passed and sent
to the Senate." House Journal, 22 October 1779, 13 STATE REcoRDs OF
NORTH CAROLINA 932 (1896). "Received from Commons a Bill for the
separation and divorcement of Alexander Dixon and Elizabeth Dixon, for-
inerly Elizabeth Molton, as man and wife, which was read for the first
time and Rejected." Senate Journal, 22 October 1779, 13 STATE REcoRDs OF
NORTH CAROLINA 843 (1896).
Applications for divorce were numerous. Mrs. Johnson found 266 such
petitions in the State Archives for the period between 1800 and 1835 (ten
years' petitions have not survived). In 1813 there were 22 applications for
divorce but only four were granted. In 1810 there were twenty petitions
and one granted. For the period surveyed by Mrs. Johnson 52 divorces
were granted out of 266 petitions, or roughly one out of five. The causes
most frequently alleged in the petitions were, in order: desertion to live
with another, desertion, cohabitation with a Negro, adultery, separation,
cruelty, prostitution, and wasting property. JoHNsON, ANTE-BELLUm NORTH
CAROLINA 217, 221. See also 2 LEFLER, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 418-19.
1
sJOHNSON, ANTE-BELLUm NORTH CAROLINA 217.
"o The evidence is of two sorts. In the case Anonymous, 2 N.C. 347
(1796), plaintiff's counsel refers to a similar case at Halifax "some years
ago" and says that "this is no new action." (No reference to the Halifax
case, given in Anonymous as Barrow v. Barrow, could be found in the in-
complete records of the Halifax District Court in the State Archives.)
Second, all three of the reported cases, Anonymous, supra, Spiller v. Spiller,
2 N.C. 482 (1797), and Knight v. Knight, 1 N.C. 163 (1799), involve only
ancillary issues, such as the power of equity to sequester the husband's prop-
erty prior to the decree, and whether the wife may sue for alimony without
a next friend. If the cases were novel we should expect from the reporter
some treatment of the substantive law of the action. Also, the appearance of
a similar case in 1823 indicates that the action survived well past the enact-
ment of the divorce statute. Harrel v. Harrel, Pasquotank County Minutes
in Equity 1822-1850, Fall Term 1823, at 27-31.
" Spiller v. Spiller, supra note 19; Knight v. Knight, supra note 19;
Anonymous, supra note 19; Short v. Short, Equity Minute Docket, Halifax
19631
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The original decree in the case of Spiller v. Spiller,2' decided in
1796, sheds much light on the nature of the action. Three issues
were submitted to the jury: (1) are the parties lawfully married,
(2) was the petitioner driven from her husband's home against her
will by his cruel conduct, (3) what property did the husband own
during the marriage.
These are exactly the issues which would have been decided by
the English ecclesiastical courts in a suit for divorce a mensa et thoro
for cruelty." If the action were intended merely as a remedy for
the duty of the husband to support the wife it is difficult to explain
the form of the second issue. A more probable form, if such were
the case, would have been "did the husband wilfully fail and refuse
to support the wife."
At common law alimony had no independent existence; it could
be granted only incidentally to the main relief sought by the peti-
tioner.2" The main relief was invariably a divorce a mensa et
thoro.24 In order to obtain that relief the petitioner had to prove
either cruelty or adultery. Therefore, the petitioner in a suit for ali-
mony without divorce in North Carolina had to prove that she was
entitled to what would have been a divorce a mensa et thoro in
England.
The court's decree in Spiller v. Spiller was that (1) the wife's
separate property of which she was possessed prior to her marriage
was confirmed to her, (2) the husband was to pay the wife two
hundred pounds for her support from the time of the separation to
Dist. Super. Ct., 6 November 1800, at 80-83; Mulford v. Mulford, Equity
Trial Docket, Wilmington Dist. Super Ct., May Term 1797.
The latter case is probably the case reported in 2 N.C. as Anonymous.
At May Term 1796 for the Wilmington District, "Ordered Deft give security
in the sum of £1000 to perform the decree of the court-that if he does not
give security within one month-a write of sequestration to issue." Mulford
v. Mulford, Wilmington Dist. Equity Trial Docket No. 65, May Term 1796.
The cryptic report in 2 N.C. refers to the right of equity to order sequestra-
tion in alimony without divorce actions. No other such case was found in the
docket book for the year 1796. The Equity Minute Book for the Wilmington
District has not survived.
1 Equity Minutes, Fayetteville Dist. Super Ct., October Term 1797, re-
ported in 2 N.C. 483 on an ancillary issue. The full text of the decree is set
out in Appendix I.
22 See SHELFORD, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 427-28.
BIsnoP § 351; Head v. Head, 3 Atk. 547, 550, 26 Eng. Rep. 1115, 1116
(Ch. 1747) ; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. Jr. 191, 195, 30 Eng. Rep. 588, 590-
91 (Ch. 1793); Rees v. Waters, 9 Watts 90 (Pa. 1839); Lawson v. Shot-
well, 27 Miss. 630, 633 (1854).
"' Ball v. Montgomery, supra note 23.
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the date of the decree, and (3) the husband was to pay the wife
fifty pounds semi-annually "during the term of her natural life."
This goes substantially farther than an English court could have
gone. As tenant by the curtesy a husband held absolute control
over his wife's property during their marriage, and after her death
if a child had been born alive of the union. The Siller decree de-
stroyed that curtesy. The common law courts would never have
tolerated interference with property rights by the ecclesiastical
courts.25 The English divorce a mensa et thoro, being only a tem-
porary suspension of marital duties, had no effect on property
rights.28
In addition the alimony payments in Spiller v. Spiller were clearly
intended to be permanent. By contrast the English divorce was
nearly always temporary in nature, looking toward reconciliation.27
LEGISLATIVE DIVORCE
The most serious defect of the divorce a mensa et thoro and the
action of alimony without divorce was they did not end the mar-
riage. Neither party was free to remarry. The English remedy for
this harsh circumstance was absolute divorce by legislative act.28
A private divorce bill did not pass both houses of the North
Carolina General Assembly until 1794.2" From then until 1835 at
least sixty-two absolute divorces were obtained from the legislature
by special act.80 There is no record of a legislative divorce a mensa
et thoro as such.
Twenty-three petitioners were successful in obtaining legislative
divorces in the twenty year period between 1794 and the passage of
the first general divorce statute in 1814.1 The latter statute ended
the practice for seven years, although petitions continued to come
before the assembly. In 1821 the legislature resumed the granting
of divorces and passed fifteen such acts until 1827. The preamble to
the general statute of 1827, attempting to halt legislative divorces
" See Setaro, History of English Ecclesiastical Law, 18 B.U.L. REv. 342,
373-75 (1938).
" Kriger v. Day, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 316 (1824) ; Dean v. Richmond, 22
Mass. (5 Pick.) 461 (1827); Clark v. Clark, 6 W. & S. 85 (Pa. 1843).
2TPOYNTER, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 168.
28 See note 4, supra.2 9N.C. Sess. Laws 1794, ch. 81. See note 17, supra.
20 See Appendix II for a table showing the number of divorces for the
years 1794-1835, and Appendix III for typical forms.
"1 See text, JUDICIAL DIVORCE, Statutory Law, infra.
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and conferring the total legislative power over divorce actions on
the courts, complains that:
The numerous applications for divorce and alimony annually
presented to the General Assembly, consume a considerable
portion of time in their examination, and consequently retard
the investigation of more important subjects of legislation;
... such applications might be adjudicated by other tribunals
with less expenditure to the State, and more impartial justice
to individuals."2
The 1827 attempt to bind future assemblies was doomed to fail-
ure. Only five years later the pressure on the legislators from
constituents not willing to undergo the long and expensive process of
obtaining a judicial divorce, or unable to bring their case within
the narrow confines of the statutes, proved too strong. Private
divorce acts reappeared in 1832, culminating in fifteen in the session
of 1835. A constitutional amendment in the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1835 permanently ended legislative divorce in North
Carolina by providing that "The General Assembly shall have power
to pass general laws regulating divorce and alimony, but shall not
have power to grant a divorce or secure alimony in any individual
case." 33 The amendment was incorporated into the new Constitu-
tion of 1868 in haec verba and has not been subsequently altered.
During its reign over matrimonial affairs, the legislature in some
cases, while declining to divorce the petitioner, granted other relief.
In 1803 the legislature began to confirm separation agreements re-
lieving the husband of all duty to support the wife, all liability for
her debts, and destroying the marital estates of dower and curtesy.
The parties regained all the rights of unmarried persons except the
right to remarry.34
Nearly every session of the legislature from 1797 to 1835 saw
the passage of omnibus bills confirming to married women their
separate property, or property they might thereafter acquire. 5 The
32 N.C. Sess. Laws 1827, ch. 19, § 1.
" N.C. Const. of 1776, Amendments of 1835, art. I, sec. IV, cl. 3, re-
printed in Rev. Code of 1854, at 23; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 10.3, The only instances of such acts are N.C. Sess. Laws 1803, ch. 116;
1806, ch. 111, 114; 1807, ch. 108-110. See Appendix III.
" See Appendix III. The first of these acts was passed in 1794. N.C.
Sess. Laws 1794, ch. 101. It recited that the husband had deserted the wife
and was living in adultery. From 1794 to 1816 every legislature except two(1801 and 1815) passed similar acts affecting the rights of from one to
[Vol. 41
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most popular private method of resolving marital difficulties was, as
we have seen, desertion or mutual separation. However, so long as
the husband lived the wife could not deal with her property in any
manner without his consent. Should the husband return to claim
his rights he was entitled to possession and all the rents and profits
earned in his absence as tenant by the curtesy. The wife's only
remedy was by special act of the legislature.
JUDICIAL DIVORCE
Statutory law
After abortive attempts in 1799 and 18086 the legislature passed
the first general divorce statute in 1814."7 The statute of 1814
authorized the Superior Courts of Law to grant either a divorce
from bed and board or an absolute divorce, in their discretion, for
natural impotency or adultery.3" The right of a jury trial on all
issues of fact was guaranteed. Condonation, recrimination, and the
fact that the husband "allowed of the wife's prostitution or exposed
her to lewd company whereby she became ensnared to the crime,"
were express bars to relief. Abandonment, cruel treatment, "such
indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable or
life burthensome," and a malicious turning out of doors were addi-
tional grounds for which the wife might obtain a divorce from bed
and board. The court might award alimony not to exceed one-third
of the husband's estate incident to a divorce from bed and board.
The legislature, however, was not ready to make divorces easy
to obtain. In addition to the severely limited grounds for divorce
provided, it was required that the judgment of the court be con-
twenty-two women. After an absence of six years they re-appear in 1823
and persist until the amendments of 1835 to the constitution. See, e.g., N.C.
Sess. Laws 1808, ch. 115 (twenty-two women named); 1823, ch. 160-63;
1825, ch. 44; 1826, ch. 143; 1827, ch. 71, 86, 117, 123, 125, 145, 147" 1834,
ch. 105, 106; 1835, ch. 82.
"' JOHNSON, ANTE-BELLUm NORTH CAROLINA 218. The act failed by
only seven votes in 1808. Ibid.
N.C. Sess. Laws 1814, ch. *869. (The chapter numbers of all Public
Laws through the session of 1820 are those assigned in Potter's Revisal, in
conformity with the practice of the North Carolina General Statutes Com-
mission. Potter omitted all the private laws and re-numbered the session
laws consecutively. An asterisk (*) placed before a chapter number herein
denotes the number assigned in Potter's Revisal. All other references are to
the original numbering.)
The divorce and alimony laws were codified from time to time as follows:
N.C. Revised Statutes of 1837, ch. 39; N.C. Revised Code of 1854, ch. 39;
Battle's Revisal of the Laws of N.C., ch. 37 (1873).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1814, ch. *869.
1963]
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firmed. by the General Assembly before the decree might become
effective. The petitioner had to allege and prove that the cause had
existed for at least six months prior to the filing of the petition to
discourage hasty action. The final decree could not issue until at
least twelve months had elapsed to encourage reconciliation. A tax
of ten pounds was exacted from the defendant. It was also provided
that the innocent party might marry again.39
Two years later, in 1816, the legislature provided that the divorce
from bed and board should automatically secure to the wife any
property she might subsequently obtain, unless the court specifically
decreed otherwise." The reason given in the preamble to the act
was that "cases of great hardship often occur, the husband being at
liberty to return and squander away the estate of the wife, subse-
quently obtained." '
From 1814 to 1818 the legislature confirmed seven divorces
granted under the statute of 1814.42 In the latter year the judg-
ments of the courts in divorce matters were made conclusive. 43 The
twelve month waiting period was repealed in 1824 as well as the
ten pound tax.4
The statute of 1827 was apparently an attempt to settle the
matter of divorce, so far as the legislature was concerned, for by that
act the Superior Courts of Law were given absolute discretion to
decree divorces "whenever they may be satisfied . ..of the justice
of such application."45 A right of appeal to the supreme court was
conferred and it was expressly provided that the guilty party might
never marry again during the lifetime of the petitioner on pain of
conviction for bigamy, which at that time was punishable by death.46
"' The positive form proved ambiguous and was clarified in 1827. N.C.
Sess. Laws 1827, ch. 19.
' N.C. Sess. Laws 1816, ch. *928, clarified by N.C. Sess. Laws 1819, ch.
*1007.
Ibid.
4N N.C. Sess. Laws 1816, ch. 68, 119, 124; 1817, ch. 37, 64; 1818, ch. 38
(two divorces in one act). Whether these acts are technically legislative
divorces is arguable. We may assume that confirmation of the judicial
decrees was perfunctory. In view of the personal opinions of the supreme
court justices it is certain there were no rash decisions in divorce matters
there. See note 1, supra.
"'N.C. Sess. Laws 1818, ch. *968.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1824, ch. 18. The section reference to the session laws
to this statute in the Revised Statutes of 1837 is in error.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1827, ch. 19, § 1.
,If the defendant were a woman she might be branded instead. The
bigamy act was first passed in 1790. N.C. Sess. Laws 1790, ch. 11, 25 STATE
REcoRDs OF NORTH CAROLIxA 74. This statute contained a peculiar proviso
(Vol. 41
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The divorce statutes were further clarified in 1828 by specifically
giving the law courts jurisdiction over alimony without divorce,
which until then had been exclusively an equitable remedy." The
statute appears to have been declaratory of the equity practice for
the remedy was allowed wherever a wife could show grounds for a
divorce from bed and board.48 It was broadened a little to include
the additional grounds that the husband was an habitual drunkard
or a spendthrift.49 The statute provided that a decree of alimony
without divorce should secure to the wife any property she might
subsequently acquire," and the next year the law courts were given
power to allow a woman to sue in her own name for alimony with-
out divorce, 1 both of which had been equity practice from the be-
ginning.52
By 1852 the substantive statutory law of divorce was rounded
out by specific conferral of concurrent jurisdiction over all divorce
and alimony causes on the equity courts, 53 provision for removal of
divorce suits to the supreme court as in suits in equity, 4 and the
that it should' not extend to any "persons... who are or shall be at the time
of such after marriage divorced according to the mode established..."
There was no "mode established" until 1814. The author of the bill proba-
bly was in sympathy with the agitation for a divorce law which Mrs. John-
son states began that year. JOHNSON, ANTE-BELLUXm NORTH CAROLINA 217.
The bigamy statute, as amended in 1809 and 1823, was codified in the
Revised Statutes of 1837, ch. 34, § 14. By 1854 the punishment had been
reduced to a fine, imprisonment, one or more public whippings, and a brand-
ing on the cheek with the letter B. Revised Code of 1854, ch. 34, § 15.
'" See note 19, supra, and accompanying text.
"'N.C. Sess. Laws 1828, ch. 44, § 2.
"' This statute, much amended, is still in effect. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 50-16(1950). It is a curious fossil but still used, primarily because under it there
is no limit on the amount of alimony which may be awarded. If the wife
obtains a divorce from bed and board under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-14, the
amount of alimony may not exceed one-third of the net annual income of the
defendant. The limitation dates from the act of 1814 and has been carried
forward ever since.
o N.C. Sess. Laws 1828, ch. 44, § 4.
"'N.C. Sess. Laws 1829, ch. 28. This was an extension of section 2 of
the act of 1819 which gave the same result in suits for divorce. N.C. Sess.
Laws 1819, ch. *1007.
" Spiller v. Spiller, Appendix I; Knight v. Knight, 1 N.C. 163 (1799).
"N.C. Sess. Laws 1834, ch. 15.
' N.C. Sess. Laws 1842, ch. 43. This statute was a result of the decision
in Holloman v. Holloman, 22 N.C. 270 (1839), which held that the supreme
court had only appellate jurisdiction over actions for divorce even though the
suit was brought in equity. Construing the statutes conferring jurisdiction
concurrently on the law and equity sides of the courts in pan materia, it was
held that a jury trial was required in divorce suits whether brought at law
or in equity. Therefore, there was no right of removal to the supreme court
for trial. North Carolina had traditionally been chary of equity procedure
1963]
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allowance of alimony pendente lite." It remained in this state until
the complete revisions of 1868 (procedural) and 1872 (substantive)
when the basic statutes constituting the present North Carolina
divorce law were enacted."
Case law
As might have been expected, suits for divorce were from the
beginning looked upon with judicial disfavor in the supreme court.7
The statute of 1814 had required that "when either has separated
himself from the other and is living in adultery,"" the court might
grant a divorce if it chose to do so. It was soon held that the
phrase did not embrace the case of adultery by one, who against his
will, had been abandoned by the other, nor where the act of adultery
had occurred during a separation by mutual consent." The cruelty
required by the court was physical violence, or at the very least
extreme indignities coupled with threats to the wife's life."0
and from the beginning had required jury trials there. For a brief period,
1823 to 1873, no jury was required, although an advisory jury was frequent-
ly employed. See Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv.
157, 159-60 (1953).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1852, ch. 52. This was also the result of a judicial
decision. In Wilson v. Wilson, 19 N.C. 377 (1837), the court had held that
alimony pendente lite could not be given without a statute.
These statutes, as amended, are codified in N.C. Gmr. STAT. ch. 50.
ZT See note 1, supra.
8 N.C. Sess. Laws 1814, ch. *869, § 1.
5 9Whittington v. Whittington, 19 N.C. 64 (1836) ; Moss v. Moss, 24 N.C.
55 (1841); Wood v. Wood, 27 N.C. 674 (1845); Foy v. Foy, 35 N.C. 98
(1851). In Wood v. Wood, supra, the court in a dictum stated that even
though the parties were living in a state of voluntary separation, and the
party suing was not entitled to an absolute divorce, the court might in some
cases decree a divorce from bed and board to prevent spurious heirs being
forced on the husband. The same case modified the stringency of the rule
somewhat by providing that where the husband's outrageous conduct forced
the wife to flee his house, the separation would be deemed his, and not hers.
In Dickinson v. Dickinson, 7 N.C. 327 (1819), the court refused to grant
a divorce for adultery committed before the passage of the act of 1814, on
grounds that a retroactive application of the act would be ex post facto. The
court reasoned that adultery had been made a crime in 1805. N.C. Sess. Laws
1805, ch. *684. To allow a divorce for adultery retroactively would be to
increase the punishment of a crime after the fact. Barden v. Barden, 14 N.C.
548 (1832) held that the act of 1827 was retroactive and neither cited the
Dickinson case nor discussed ex post facto.
" Hansley v. Hansley, 32 N.C. 506 (1849); Coble v. Coble, 55 N.C. 392(1856); Everton v. Everton, 50 N.C. 202 (1857); Erwin v. Erwin, 57 N.C.
82 (1858) ; Joyner v. Joyner, 59 N.C. 322 (1862). The latter case held that
a husband might prudently chastise his wife with a horse-whip so long as
the beating was not unjustified or unduly harsh.
The supreme court did not hear a case of alimony without divorce on
appeal until after the Civil War, nor did it consider the other statutory ground
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The absolute discretion over the causes for which divorce might
be granted conferred on the courts by the statute of 1827 went un-
tapped. The 1827 act was construed as being in addition to the
statute of 1814, not as abrogating its restrictions on the cause of
adultery."' Nor was it utilized to create new causes. Even so
heinous an offense, to a nineteenth century Southerner, as the birth
to his wife of a mulatto child sired before the marriage, did not move
the justices."2 So far from delighting in his unlimited freedom, the
great Chief Justice Ruffin was profoundly disturbedY He felt the
legislature surely could not have intended the court to allow their
personal opinions 4 to determine whether the parties should be freed
from their bond.65 In the absence of any expression of legislative
intent to guide them the justices were loathe to undertake independ-
ently the task of molding new substantive law.66
The sole use made of the discretionary power was the curious
bringing of annulment actions under the divorce statutes.67  It was
reasoned that the complete delegation of legislative power to the
courts in divorce matters was an incorporation into the law of North
Carolina of the entire English law of matrimonial causes, so far as
it was suited to the conditions of this country.6" Thus, instead of
annulling the marriages of idiots and lunatics on common law
for divorce, impotency. The one case involving impotency, Smith v. More-
head, 59 N.C. 360 (1863), was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since peti-
tioner had brought the suit in the wrong county.
"1 Collier v. Collier, 16 N.C. 352 (1829); Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C.
535 (1832).
02 Scroggins v. Scroggins, supra note 61. At the same term the court
annulled a marriage for this cause. Barden v. Barden, 14 N.C. 548 (1832).
In Barden the petitioning husband alleged that he was induced to marry the
defendant by her false representation that the mulatto child with which she
was pregnant was his. Chief Justice Ruffin, hesitante, acquiesced in the
opinion of his brethren and annulled the marriage on grounds of fraudulent
misrepresentation.
62 Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. 535 (1832).
E Judging from Justice Ruffin's opinions, if this had been true there would
have been no divorce whatever in North Carolina.
"Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. 535 (1832). Chief Justice Ruffin
wrote the opinion in every divorce case involving substantive law until his
aeath. Justice Pearson dealt with the procedural aspects.
"A rather strange attitude today! See Weeks, Book Review, 41 N.C.L.
lRv. 325 (1963).
"7 Crump v. Morgan, 38 N.C. 91 (1843) (lunatic); Johnson v. Kincade,
37 N.C. 470 (1843) (idiot). The reporter, Iredell, included the court's decree
in his report of Crump v. Morgan as "such cases are novel in the State, and
the form of the decree was settled by the court itself." 38 N.C. at 103 n.a.
" Crump v. Morgan, 38 N.C. 91 (1843). This case is often cited in sup-
port of the proposition that ecclesiastical law is part of the common law.
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grounds that they lack contractual capacity, the court decreed
"divorce" under the act of 1827.6"
CONCLUSION
Thus we have seen that extrication from an unhappy union was
no easy task in ante-bellum North Carolina.7" Although the courts
were given a rare opportunity, to build the substantive law of divorce
unhampered by statute or stare decisis, the invitation was declined.
Had there been judicial sympathy with the action of divorce, North
Carolina might have escaped the stultifying technicalities of divorce
law which have plagued litigants to' the present day. We may
lament the loss.
JosEPHa S. FERRELL
Associate Editor
'o The court never had occasion to determine whether denominating the
action a "divorce" invoked the statutory prohibition against the guilty party's
remarriage. This certainly would not have been the English rule, since annul-
ment is a declaration that the marriage has never had any legal existence.
"
0In 1822 the court had held that divorce might be granted only for
grounds enumerated in the statute of 1814. Long v. Long, 9 N.C. 189 (1822).
There the defendant had communicated venereal disease to the petitioner.
From the beginning a strict correspondence between allegation and proof
was required. See, e.g., Foy v. Foy, 35 N.C. 90 (1851).
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Appendix I*
DECREE
Court met according to Adjournment
present the Honourable
Samuel Ashe &
John Williams, Esquires
Margaret Spiller
VS.
James Spiller
The cause being heard by the Jury their verdict was as follows:
James Spiller, and Margaret Spiller, formerly Marg't Stuart, are
lawfully married and that said Margaret was driven and forced
away from her Husband's house by her Husband, said James
Spiller, and not by her own accord; and that James Spiller was
possessed of Property to the following amounts at those several
times, Viz:
In the year 1784, in Lands 2,341 acres valued at £1,150
In Negroes 12 in number, valued at £1,200
Total £2,350
In the year 1789, In Land 5,342 acres valued at £2,671
In Negroes 18 in numb. val'd at £1,800
Total £4,471
In the year 1792, In Land 1,439 acres valued at £ 719
In Negroes 8 in numb. val'd at £ 800
Total £1,519
And that the said Spiller in the year 1791 conveyed to Elizabeth
Spiller 1,200 acres of Land valued at £900, also ten Negroes valued
at £1,000.
Also that he conveyed to Ellen Spiller in the year - 2,000
acres of Land valued at £1,500 and ten Negroes val'd at £1,000.
DECREED that Margaret Spiller retain as her own absolute
right and property all the Estate which she was possessed of prior
to her intermarriage with the said James Spiller, and which she
* Equity Minutes, Fayetteville Dist. Super. Ct., April term 1797. Punc-
tuation has in some instances been modernized. The manuscript is in the
North Carolina State Archives and may be found in the Equity Minute Book
above cited. The suit began 23 April 1791 and took six years.
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now holds by virtue of the Articles of their Intermarriage, and by
the delivery of the said James to her. And that said James pay to
her, the said Margaret his wife, the sum of two hundred pounds
currency to enable her to pay and discharge the expense of her
maintenance and support which has accrued from the - day of-
to the present time, which said two hundred pounds to be paid in
payments as follows:
(to wit) £50 to be paid on the 1st day of December next following
the date hereof, the residue of the said £200 to be paid in half yearly
payments, from the 1st day of December-to wit-;650 on the 1st
day of June 1795, £50 on the 1st day of December 1795, and the
remainder on the 1st day of June, 1796.
AND IT IS FURTHER DECREED that the said James pay
to the said Margaret £100 per annum for and during the term of
her natural life, and for her sole and separate use, and as her ali-
mony, to be paid to her in half yearly payments-that is to say, £50
to be paid on the 6th day of April next following the date hereof,
£50 the residue of the said £100 on the sixth day of October next
following, and so to continue to make such payments and at such
stated times as above directed during the Term of her natural life
aforesaid, the payments to be made at the usual place of residence
or dwelling of the said Margaret, or at the Office of the Clerk and
Master in Equity for the District of Fayetteville, and that all the
Estate Real and personal of the said James are bound and made
subject to pay and satisfy the said several sums of money above
expressed and directed to be paid, and on failure of any of said
payments, the said Margaret, may, after the expiration of ten days
after such failure, take out Execution against the Goods and Chat-
tels, Land & Tenements of the said James, in the same manner as
is directed by the Act of Assembly passed at Tarborough on the
18th day of November, 1787-Unless said James shall give good
and suf't Security in the sum of £2,000 currency with two or more
sufficient Freeholders before the Master in Equity, subject to the
exception of the Court, for the faithful and perpetual payment of the
Said Annuity of £100, at the time and places above stated, after
such security being given and approved of by the Court, or said
Margaret, then the Estate of the said James to be released and dis-
charged.
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Appendix II
LEGISLATIVE DIVORCES, 1794-1835
Year No. of divorces$ Statutory reference*
1794 1 81
1796 1 99
1798 1 106
1802 2 114, 115
1804 2 123, 124
1806 2 104, 105
1808 1 78
1810 1 130
1811 3 98-100
1812 5 37-41
1813 4 41, 84, 92, 95
1821 2 104, 106
1822 1 68
1823 2 141, 142
1824 3 135-137
1825 4 90, 102, 109, 139
1826 3 134
1832 1 106
1833 2 104, 107
1834 6 76-81
1835 15 62-77
Total 62
* Reference is to chapter number of the session laws for the year indi-
cated.
t From 1816 to 1818 the legislature confirmed 7 divorces granted by the
Superior Courts. N.C. Sess. Laws 18,16, ch. 68, 119, 124; 1817, ch. 37, 64:
1818, ch. 38.
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Appendix III
TYPICAL FORMS
I. Private Divorce.
"This indenture made this 24 Day of May 1803 ... Between
John Farrow... and Rebekah Farrow his wife... witnesseth, that
whereas some unhappy differences have arisen Between them in
consequence of which they have mutually agreed to separate them-
selves... John and Rebekah do firmly agree with Each Other to
finally Desolve the Marriage Contract once made between us and
that Either of us may and Shall have Free and undenied Liberty to
Live Single or to Entermarry again with any other person.., and
we do further agree... that we will not carry on any prosecution
against the other so marrying...."'
This agreement was confirmed by the legislature: "Whereas the
said John Farrow ... and Rebekah his wife, from the most im-
perious necessity, in its nature insurmountable, have mutually agreed
,n live separate and apart from each other forever...
"Be it enacted... that ... the said Rebecca Farrow shall have,
hold, possess, and enjoy, all such property as she now possesses, or
that she may hereafter acquire.. . and not subject to the control...
of her husband, nor liable to any of his debts or contracts.
"And be it further enacted... that ... John Farrow shall not be
liable or subject to pay any debts of his said wife Rebekah, whether
the same be for necessities or otherwise; nor shall he be liable or
subject to any demand ... for alimony... nor shall the said Re-
becca hereafter claim or have dower.., or be entitled to any dis-
tributive share of his estate."2
1I. Legislative Divorce.'
Be it enacted... that A. B. of the county of Wake, and wife of
C. D. be, and she is hereby declared to be separated and divorced
fully and absolutely from her husband C. D., and that she be re-
stored to all the privileges and immunities of a feme sole, and enjoy
the same, as amply and entirely, as if she had never been connected
by the bonds of matrimony, with her husband the said C. D.
Quoted in JOHNsoN, ANTE-Br.Lum NORTH CAROLINA 220 from a MS
in Legislative Papers, 1807, in the North Carolina State Archives.
2 N.C. Sess. Laws 1807, ch. 107. Similar acts appear in N.C. Sess. Laws
1803, ch. 116; 1806, ch. 111, 114; 1807, ch. 108-110.
'See, e.g., N.C. Sess. Laws 1835, ch. 62.
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III. Acts Confirming Property to Married Women.4
Be it enacted that A. B. of Wilkes County, wife of C. D., be,
and she is hereby entitled to hold, possess and enjoy, in her sole
right, any estate, either real or personal, which she [now has or]
may hereafter acquire, by her own industry, purchase, gift or other-
wise, in as full and ample a manner as if she had never been married
to her said husband; and she is hereby authorized to prosecute or
defend any suit in her own name, in any court within this State,
in the same manner as if she had never been married.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Hospital Records
In Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.' the defendant sought
to introduce in evidence its insured's hospital record in an attempt
to show that she had made certain misrepresentations about her
health when applying for a life insurance policy. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that although records of this type are hear-
say, they are generally admissible, being within the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. However, admission of the par-
ticular record involved was denied on the grounds that it contained
privileged communications between physician and patient.'
At common law, business records offered to prove the facts re-
corded therein were admissible upon a showing that the records
were made in the regular course of business, with the personal
knowledge of the entrant, at or near the time of the transaction
' See, e.g, N.C. Sess. Laws 1827, ch. 71. The bracketed words in this
form were not always present. The first of these acts was passed in 1794.
It recited that the husband had deserted the wife and was living in adultery.
N.C. Sess. Laws 1794, ch. 101. The number of women named in the acts
varied from one to twenty-two. In at least one a man was included. N.C.
Sess. Laws 1808, ch. 115.
1257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953), provides "no person, duly authorized
to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose any information
which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional charac-
ter, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for
such patient as a physician or to do any act for him as a surgeon: Provided,
that the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure,
if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice."
The court in the instant case held that this privilege extends to hospital rec-
ords which contain entries made by physicians, or under their direction,
pertaining to information obtained while treating the patient in a professional
capacity. 257 N.C. at 38, 125 S.E.2d at 331 (1962).
